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The Norman Conquest of 1066 is perhaps one of the most debated events in history.
Because of the outcome of one battle, Hastings, England became more involved in the
tumultuous political atmosphere of continental Europe; English language and culture became
forever scarred from French influence; and the kings of England (William, and his descendants,
the Plantagenets), while ruling their kingdom, would, due to feudal complications, still be
considered vassals to the King of France as Duke of Normandy. It is not so much the results of
the Conquest that are debated but the course of the event itself: namely, to explain why William
won, why Harold lost, and what means were taken by each side. There are many different
interpretations on the reason for the outcome of Hastings, some of which must be discussed
briefly.
One interpretation, which is widely accepted, holds that William’s brilliant generalship is
the primary reason for the Norman Victory. David C. Douglas, who adheres to this school of
thought affirms that “discipline, however, in the last resort, depends upon ultimate command,
and the more the battle of Hastings is contemplated, the more clearly appears the personal
contribution of Duke William to the final result.”1 R. Allen Brown, too, affirms this orthodox
interpretation set down by the nineteenth century historians Freeman and Round: “They [the
Normans] won, this paper would suggest, amongst other means by superior military techniques
and by superior generalship.”2 This school has considerable merit, not only from its persistence
as an orthodox view, but that it is affirmed by many Medievalists of the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries.
On the contrary, there exists another interpretation which explains the outcome of
Hastings not as William’s superiority in generalship, but in Harold’s disadvantages. Richard
Glover, considered the leader of this school, affirms: “the generalship of the Conqueror after his
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landing at Pevensey must surely appear in a much more creditable light, a light more worthy of
the man.”3 Furthermore, “the art of war in England is placed upon the road where one would
expect to find it, a road closely parallel with the progress of the art of war upon the continent,”4
namely, that the English had at that time a proper cavalry and archers in their military
institutions, along with a battle-hardened and experienced leader in their king, Harold
Godwinson. Therefore, William, while a strong leader, may not have been as brilliant as others
have supposed, and Harold may in fact have been as mighty a leader as William.
This paper will explore the reasons for Norman victory. Many contingent factors must be
explored for a thorough analysis of William’s victory. Several tumultuous events in the years
prior to the Conquest set the stage for 1066, mainly events that further complicated the issue of
succession for the English throne. Assessing the organization and preparedness of each side is
also key to evaluating their respective formidability. Furthermore, the course of Hastings, which
ultimately determines the Victor, is also essential for an explanation of the Norman victory. At
the end of this paper it will be apparent that William’s strengths in organization best explains the
outcome of Hastings, and moreover the Norman Conquest.
The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle provides a brief account for the year in three manuscripts (C,
D, and E) which all focus on different areas and aspects of the year AD 1066. D perhaps
provides the most detailed account, in that it provides sufficient dates, names, and occurrences,
lacking the insightful analysis. The Chronicle is best used as a sources for chronology of events.
So too, are the additional sources on the Norman Conquest of England, the most well-known
being the chronicles of William of Poitiers and Robert Wace. The two, in their respective
chronicles, while staying true to the events and chronology, romanticize the events in such a way
that their works may be recited by bards; because of such chroniclers, much of the historical
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works produced in the Medieval period are a mixture of fact and legend. Therefore, in order to
produce a more thorough analysis contemporary books and articles will be used as sources for
this paper.
The death of St. Edward the Confessor in January of 1066 sparks the fuse of the fateful
year that would determine the progression of western European history for centuries to come. On
his deathbed, the Confessor is reported to have named Harold Godwinson, the current Earl of
Wessex, his heir, to which the Witan, the Anglo-Saxon regal court, approved and elected Harold
to be king.5 How Harold attained such high status is questionable, and was most likely made
possible due to the immense influence he had acquired from 1057 to 1064. Harold’s ascension
angered William, who saw Harold as not only betraying his oath as vassal to the Norman Duchy,
but also as a usurper of the throne to which he was rightful heir. Also hungry for power, Tostig,
brother of Harold, aligned himself with Harald Sigurdsson, king of Norway, promising him the
throne if he could be reinstated in his Earldom at Northumbria, from which he had been exiled
by Harold. All of these complicated relationships and the political turmoil that was spawned by
the death of Edward the Confessor must be further explained for an analysis to be made.
Harold was the son of the influential Earl of Wessex, Godwin, who was a relative of
Cnut, the king of England preceding the reign of the Confessor. Tensions between the two
factions had already been made when Cnut exiled Edward and his brother, Alfred, to Normandy
in 1028, where they were protected and supported by Duke Robert II, William’s father.6 Alfred,
deciding to venture to England to claim the throne during a period of instability, was captured by
Godwin, who sent him to Scandinavia where he was killed. Stemming from this conflict, Edward
could have had reserved feelings of contempt toward Godwin and his descendants,7 which would
explain his inclination toward the Norman Duchy, and not the Earl of Wessex. Edward,
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nonetheless, ascended the throne of England in 1042 as a protégé of Normandy.8 He routed out
external opposition early on by diverting invasions from Scandinavia, and routed out opposition
internally by banishing Godwin and his family, who had revolted against the king in 1051.9 He
naturally was predisposed to Normandy, since Duke Robert had protected him and supported his
claim to the English throne, as well as sending aid to Edward in order to secure his kingdom.10
Therefore it makes sense to conclude, as several sources indicate, that Edward had indeed named
William his heir in 1051, and that Edward additionally held the descendants of Godwin with
equal disdain due to the murder of his brother.11
However, a year later in 1052 Godwin would reestablished himself in his earldom,
returning from his exile in Flanders, with the help of his sons who sailed from Ireland, Harold
being among them.12 Consequently, any hope of continuing an Anglo-Norman alliance was then
lost, and all Norman forces that had been in England were routed out.13 Godwin died the
following year, after which the Earldom of Wessex passed to Harold.14 Additionally, Tostig,
Harold’s brother, would receive the Earldom of Northumbria after the death of Earl Siward in
1055, therefore further increasing the Godwin family’s power and influence in England. In the
meantime, William had been preoccupied with dissent in his own Dukedom in which he was still
asserting his power and dominance.15 From 1053 to 1057, Harold’s prestige would only rise, and
by 1064 it had risen so much “that an annalist could refer to him as ‘under-king’ (subregulus).”16 Due to the change of the status-quo in England during the 1050s, Edward was
pressured to grant the promise of succession to Harold in William’s stead.
In 1064, Harold was sent by Edward to Normandy as an envoy, supposedly to inform
William of the change in future succession for English Kingship.17 To welcome him, the
Normans threw him into prison, after which he was brought to William as an honorable guest.

Pierlott 5
Harold then swore an oath as vassal to William to act as his representative in Edward’s court.18
Being in a rather awkward situation, Harold was forced to submit to William’s demand. He was,
after all, in Norman territory and surrounded by William’s men; if he refused to make an oath
they would have most probably killed him. On the other end, William saw Harold’s visit as an
opportunity to further secure his own succession. Little did he realize Harold had held much
more influence in England since the rise of the Godwin family in the latter 1050s. With the
Confessor’s death nearing, Harold only had to bide his time before he would ascend to the
throne, most likely knowing he would have to fight for legitimacy.
One last event sets the stage for the conflict of 1066: Tostig, brother of Harold and Earl
of Northumbria, was ousted from his own Earldom during a rebellion in 1065, after which he
fled to Flanders just as his father had fourteen years prior.19 Thus, Harold’s position in England
was somewhat weakened, as Tostig would eventually become his enemy in the following year.
However, after Edward’s death, Harold would still inherit the English throne;20 opposition to his
eventual rule would come overseas, not from within the country. It is still curious that Harold’s
own brother would play a part in determining the next English king.
Thus, as aforementioned, Edward the Confessor would die in January of 1066, with
Harold crowned hastily after the funeral.21 Both William, who had grounds to claim Harold’s
ascension as a personal offense, and Harald Sigurdsson, the Norwegian King, began making
preparations for invasions that would not embark until September of that year.22 Tostig, who
would return to England in May, aligned himself with Sigurdsson, perhaps with the motivation
of being restored to his Earldom in Northumbria.23 Thus, the players took the stage in 1066 to
determine the future of English history and its future role in relation to the rest of the continent.
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When considering the fifty years leading up to 1066 it can be ascertained that the realm
of England was considerably unstable. David C. Douglas explains that “England, albeit
comprising two ecclesiastical provinces and three great earldoms, was evidently conceived as a
single kingdom whose political identity must override the differences inherent in the individual
traditions of its several parts.”24 What is evident is that England was divisive at this point in
history. At the time of his death, the Confessor was firmly established in his regal territory;
however, with the Godwin family controlling much of England, along with Morcar assuming
power in Northumbria in Tostig’s stead, there was much tension, as well as little that the
Confessor could do.25 His Earls passively rivaled one another for succession, for Harold would
not have ventured to Normandy in 1065 if he did not wish to win regal favor. Even before the
1060s, Edward had many problems involving Godwin and his sons disregarding his influence in
1051 and forcing their way out of exile in 1052. He also had to force his way onto his own
throne after the death of Cnut, the previous king, in 1042. Therefore, it is evident that the
political atmosphere in Anglo-Saxon England was not ideal for organizing under one banner. As
Douglas affirms, it consisted of several separate Earldoms, all superficially under one kingdom.
The military organization of Anglo-Saxon England was deeply rooted in the Germanic
culture from which it came.26 Each Earl has his own personal force of housecarls, the AngloSaxon elite infantry, as well as a system of calling up trained soldiers for campaigns which were
typically ordered by the king.27 In times of emergency in which foreign invasion was imminent,
a fyrd was called, in which five representatives from five nearby hides would meet an invading
force in the battle field; this is what the learned Professor Hollister calls the select fyrd.28 The
other type, which he calls the great fyrd, was comprised of all freemen of a particular region
who, poorly armed, would meet an invading force, usually coming from the sea.29 This great
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fyrd was called to combat the many Viking Invasions of England, as well as Harold’s return from
Ireland in 1052.30 Thanes were another trained force in the Anglo-Saxon military, perhaps the
equivalent of French and Norman knights.31 It has been suggested by the learned Richard Glover
that “the weapons and equipment of the amoured men on the two sides are almost precisely the
same,” therefore concluding that the Anglo-Saxons had a proper cavalry at their disposal.32
However, he relies too heavily on Snorri Sturluson’s saga, Heimskringla, and is also dismissive
of the broad variety of William’s force.33 Furthermore, Hollister, in critiquing Glover’s
argument, points out his inconsistency in terminology for who consists of the supposed AngloSaxon cavalry. Glover seems to conclude that the housecarls made up the Anglo-Saxon cavalry,
but in other places refers to the Old English term cniht, which translates to knight.34 Hollister
shows Glover is contradictory and unclear here, for he could be referring to the fyrd as a cavalry
force, which is unlikely since the fyrd had no formal training period.35
In regards to Hastings, Glover claims that “the new army which Harold sought to scrape
together… could only be raised from a country already stripped of the materials of which armies
were to be made.”36 When considering the organization of both the select and great fyrds
presented by Hollister, Glover’s assessment seems to be lacking in information. The fyrd that
Harold would have called in the North to combat Sigurdsson would have been a different force
than the one he called in the South to combat William, because the organization of the fyrd was
regionally based, as evidenced earlier. Harold was able to muster a fyrd force quickly upon
arriving at Hastings for the purposes of defense, which he added to his own force of housecarls,
amounting to around 5,000 men in total.37 The whole country would not have been entirely
stripped of its resources. Hastings was also one of the longest battles in the Medieval period,
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lasting about twelve hours in total; therefore, Harold’s force could not have been so bereft of
men and supplies if they could contend with the Normans for half a day.
As a whole, Harold’s force mostly consisted of infantry, with his housecarls focused in
the center, and light-armored fyrd forces and some archers on either flank.38 Additionally, the
infantry maintained a shield wall in the front of their force, which Harold positioned on a hill
near Hastings.39 Due to such a defensive position, without the cavalry that Glover insists on, it
may have been the case that Harold did not seek to defeat William; he may have only wanted to
hold William off until reinforcements could come. William, on the other hand, clearly sought to
destroy Harold’s army, which was the only thing that stood between him and London.
Therefore, Norman forces and organization prove that William was both determined and
cautious about his invasion of England. From an early age the task of proving his own mettle was
set before William, from which he did not shy away. From 1040, when he had just came of age,
to 1060, he grew in power and influence in Normandy by routing out opposition, and
establishing a court of close friends and advisers in whom he could place trust.40 Certain
instances came in which he would rival the Capetian King of France, Henry I, who would align
himself with rebellious barons within William’s hold.41 However, after Philip I rose to the
Capetian throne in 1060 at the age of eight, William would no longer have tense issues involving
the King, which perhaps allowed him to prepare as much as he did for his conquest of England.42
Through his dealing with internal issues during the early years of his reign, William proved
himself as a formidable strategic leader and also ensured the stability of his duchy, allowing him
to effectively organize in 1066.
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This process of organization is one that conveys both William’s caution in contending
with Harold, whom he most likely considered to be a formidable opponent, as well as his own
ambition for attaining an inheritance which, in his mind, had been usurped by a traitor. William’s
force consisted of about 10,000-14,000 men,43 which he transported with approximately 700
ships, 100 to 150 of which had most likely been of Byzantine design.44 Out of the estimated
number of men, a third of the total was cavalry, along with another significant portion of infantry
archers.45 William had also gathered a large amount of mercenary forces from all over Northern
Europe; after all, his “force at Hastings,” as Hollister attests, “was by no means a typical Norman
army.”46 William maintained this highly organized and varying army together the summer of
1066 on the shores of Northern France, during which time he relocated from Dives to SaintValery and waited through inclement weather for the right conditions to cross the channel swiftly
and safely.47 This delay in crossing proved to be an unexpected advantage for the Duke of
Normandy, since Harold, who had been focused on defending his shores from an impending
Norman invasion for the majority of the summer, had to travel North to battle the Norwegian
King.48 Godwinson defeated Sigurdsson and Tostig at Stamford Bridge on 25 September, after
which he marched hastily South with his remaining troops to mount a defense against William.49
Thus, William would land at Pevensey unopposed on the morning of 28 September 1066.50
William crossed with the Norman army for the purposes of conquest, not of pillaging. He
would not have conscripted such a formidable force, built ships of special, foreign design, or
built fortifications upon landing51 if he had no intention of conquest and, afterward, permanent
establishment. In addition, William also waited for Harold to come to him, perhaps a cautious
move on the Duke’s part. This wariness may reveal the respect that William had for his
opponent. However, when Harold’s force arrived in the vicinity of Hastings and had hastily
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established itself on high ground, William moved towards the Anglo-Saxon army, capitalizing on
the opportunity of contending with a battle-weary and unorganized opponent.52
Almost all sources indicate that William made great use of his cavalry and archers during
the course of Hastings (14 October 1066).53 He conducted feigned retreats with his infantry
down the hill, in an attempt to lure the Anglo-Saxons towards the hill’s base, at which point his
cavalry would trample over the English infantrymen who had fallen into the trap.54 The greatest
mistakes for the Anglo-Saxons was their pursuit of these feigned retreats from their defensive
position. If they had not, the course of the battle may have gone more in their favor. As for
William and the Normans, they succeeded in making use of the variety of their army: the
infantry conducted the feigned retreats; the archers would send follies of arrows into the air
towards the defenders on the hill;55 and the cavalry would trample on the Anglo-Saxon
infantrymen who had so foolishly pursued the retreating Norman infantry. During the course of
the battle, Harold was killed; the Bayeux Tapestry and other contemporary sources depict him
being shot in the eye with an arrow and trampled underfoot by Norman cavalry.56 Douglas
speculates that Harold was killed by an arrow during one of the Norman follies.57 After his death,
the Norman forces took the defensive position, and by then it was nighttime; the battle was
over.58 The Normans were victorious.
The outcome of Hastings is best explained through Norman victory. It is true that Harold
had many disadvantages going into the battle, as he had made a swift march from Stamford
Bridge to Hastings in less than a month. It is also rather unusual for so many major battles to be
fought in so short a period of time, especially for the medieval period.59 The size of the battles is
also unique.60 However, William, who had participated in his second battle with Hastings,61
proved to be the better leader, and the Normans a more formidable force. As evidenced, he
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conscripted his force from all over Normandy and Western Europe, he kept said force together
from summer into fall during a period of inclement weather which delayed their crossing, he
prepared diligently for Harold by building fortifications at Pevensey and Hastings, and finally he
made great use of the variety of professional soldiers he had at his disposal. Harold still did
prove to be a formidable opponent; if he had not, the battle would not have lasted for half a day.
It was William who succeeded both strategically and tactically, capitalizing upon every
opportunity that was presented to him, with which he could barely win in the end after twelve
hours.
William would be crowned at Westminster Abbey on Christmas Day 1066, after which
he would spend his reign pacifying the countryside and routing out opposition, just as he had
done during his youth in Normandy. Thenceforth, England would become more closely tied with
the political atmosphere of the continent. William’s descendants, the Plantagenets, would have to
deal with the paradox of feudalism that was now in place: they would be vassal to the Capetian
King of France on the continent, while King of England on the great isle.
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